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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM HAROLD KENDRICK,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13888

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant* William Harold Kendrick, appeals
from a conviction of the crime of robbery entered against
him in the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of robbery by a jury
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and was sentenced to serve in the Utah State Prison for
the indeterminate term of 1-15 years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the verdict and judgment rendered by the jury at the
trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of
Facts with the following additions and corrections:
1. The evidence offered by the State proved that:
(a) appellant and Mr. Travis entered the lounge together and pushed Mr. Zancanella and Mr. Roberts down
on the floor (Tr. 32, 33, 80); (b) appellant and Mr.
Travis forcibly took the victims' wallets, money, and
other personal belongings, and then took money belonging to the business located in a money bag and cash
register behind the bar counter (Tr. 33-36, 55-58); (c)
Mr. Roberts was beaten and lost consciousness when be
was hit over the bead (Tr. 36, 55-56); (d) two persons
left the lounge together carrying a money bag (Tr. 81);
(e) Mr. Zancanella told the police he had been robbed
(Tr. 84, 112); (f) appellant, Mr. Travis, and Miss Ruwe
were later apprehended with various rolls of coins, sacks,
and personal items belonging to Mr. Zancanella, Mr.
Roberts, and the lounge (Tr. 108, 109); (g) at the place
of apprehension, Mr. Zancanella identified appellant and
Mr. Travis as the men who had robbed him (Tr. 126).
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2. Mr. Zancanella denied ever putting his hand on
Mr. Travis or making a pass at appellant or making a
homosexual pass at the bartender (Tr. 41, 42, 48).
3. Mr. Roberts denied ever raising his fists or yelling at appellant (Tr. 75).
4. Mr. LaVoie, a bystander across the street from
the scene of the crime, testified that two people got out
of a blue 1962 Impala with green license plates and white
lettering, went into the lounge, exited carrying a money
bag, and drove quickly away (Tr. 79-83).
5. Appellant, M^. Travis, and Miss Ruwe had used
and were apprehended in a v^hcile fitting the above description (Tr. 92, 114, 116).
6. The refusal of Mr. Tnavis to testify was not
anticipated by the prosecution (Tr. 187, 188).
7. The four leading questions asked by the prosecution to Mr. Travis at the time Mr. Travis refused to
testify did not incorporate the testimony given by Mr.
Travis at his previous trial. Rather, the only questions
that the prosecution asked involved whether Mr. Travis
had previously met or traveled with the appellant and
certainly did not incorporate the testimony within the
fifty-six pages of transcript (Tr. 186).
NOTE: Page numbers refer to typed numbers of
the transcript as determined by the reporter in the trial
count below, in accordance with appellant's brief,, and
not according to transcript page numbecrs which include
the documents' portion of the transcript on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE
APPELLANT'S SIXTH A M E N D M E N T
RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES
AGAINST HIM BY RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE A CODEFENDANT'S PRIOR TESTIMONY.
Appellant was convicted of robbery under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, which provides:
"(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate
presence, against his will, accomplished by
means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree,"
The fact that the basic elements of the crime of
robbery were committed is not disputed by appellant.
Appellant's contenition is that the trial court violated
appellant's Sixth Amendment rights to confront the witnesses against him when the court allowed a codefendant's prior testimony to be received into evidence, which
was given at the codefendant's own separate trial and
which implicated the appellant. Respondent contends
that (1) the admission of the prior testimony does not
raise a constitutional issue with respect to appellant's
Sixth Amendment rights; (2) any constitutional objec-
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tion that is raised falls within the exceptions outlined
by the United States Supreme Court; and (3) even if
appellant's right to confront the witnesses against him
was violated, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. The admission of the prior testimony in the
present case did not violate appellant's constitutional
rights, but rather was designed to attack the credibility
of the oodefendaixt. The prosecution was aware that the
codefendant had implicated the appellant in the robbery
during the codefendant's earlier severed testimony. In
order to present this additional implicating evidence before the jury, the codefendant was called by the prosecution to testify against the appellant (Tr. 183). The
codefendant's refusal to tesitify was not anticipated by
the prosecution (Tr. 187, 188). Because the codefendant
refused to testify, the trial court held the codefendant
in comtempt of court on the grounds that the codefendant was not an accused in the oasq, he waived his Fifth
Amendment rights at the time of his trial and based on
his testimony at that time, he claimed innocence of this
particular robbery, and if he testified the same way, it
would not incriminate him (Tr. 185, 187). The trial court
had the authority to require the codefendant to testify
under Rule 25(a), U. R. E. (1971), which requires a witness to testify and not invoke the privilege against selfincrimination if the judge finds that the matter will
not incriminate the witness. Nevertheless, the prosecution was faced with two difficult alternatives. The prose-
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cution could either allow the jury to infer from the codefendant's refusal to testify that the codefendant had
committed the crime, and not the appellant, or the prosecution could impeach the codefendant as a hostile witness by introducing his prior inconsistent testimony. The
prosecution of course chose to impeach the codefendant
under Rule 20, U. R. E. (1971), which allowed any party,
including the party calling the witness,, to introduce any
statement or conduct relevant upon the issues of credibility, and under Rule 63(1), U. R. E. (1971), which
provides:
"A prior statement of a witness, if the judge
finds that the witness had an adequate opportunity to perceive the event or condition which
his statement narrates, describes, or explains,
provided that (a) it is inconsistent with his present testimony, or (b) it contains otherwise admissible facts which the witness denies having
stated or has forgotten since making the statement, or (c) it will support testimony made by
the witness in the present case when such testimony has been challenged."
Rule 63(1) "also makes such statement, when admitted,
substantive evidence in the case." Under the Rules of
Evidence, therefore^ the prior testimony of the codefendant was admissible for impeachment purposes and could
be considered as substantive evidence.
Appellant's argument, that such evidence should not
be admissible, is also invalid because of its sheer impracticality. If the court were to adopt the position of
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the appellant no severed trial of any eodefendants would
be free from the defense tactic of each defendant blaming his codef endant, and then refusing to testify in the
codefendant's separate trial, assured that the prior inconsistent testimony would never be allowed to be introduced in either of the trials. By denying the prosecution the opportunity to call as a witness a codefendant
whose testimony has implicated the defendant on trial
and to impeach his refusal to testify by prior inconsistent
tesitimony, the court would be burdening the prosecution
with requirements beyond their control simply on the
basis that the eodefendants had been granted a severed
trial. Clearly, such a blanket opportunity for collusion
with no similar opportunity afforded the prosecution to
present prior inconsistent testimony is not warranted.
B. The decisions of the United States Supreme
Court make it dear that the purpose of the confrontation clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the trath-determining process in criminal trials
by assuring that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. Button
v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 91 S. Ot. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213
(1970). The common law has always recognized exceptions to the confrontation dause where the defendant
was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
and the witness was subsequently unavailable to testify.
Existence of these exceptions to the confrontation clause
indicates that the confrontation clause does not confer
an absolute right to cross-examine.
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Indeed, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 85 S. Ct.
1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 933 (1965), the landmark decision
which held that the right of cross-examination was included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to
confront the witnesses against him, referred to many
decisions that have approved the admission of hearsay
evidence. Professor McCormick, in explaining that the
emphasis of the confrontation clause is concerned with
personal presence of the witness at the trial and affording defense counsel an opportunity for cross-examination,
also agrees that the confrontation clause is not absolute
and that in some instances both requirements may be
dispensed with. McCormick, Evidence 606 (1972).
Most of the decisions involving a defendant's right
to confront the witnesses against him concern prior testimony by the appellant offered in a preliminary hearing
or prior statements by the appellant made out of the
courtroom. Thus, the present case is rather unique in
that the prior testimony was offered by the appellant's
codefendant in a previous severed trial.
The Utah Rules of Evidence allow the introduction
of prior testimony under Rule 63 (3), as an exception to
the hearsay rule, if:
". . . the judge finds that the declarant is
unavailable as a witness . . . in another action
. . ., when . . . the issue is such that the adverse
party on the former occasion has the right and
opportunity for cross-examination with an interest and motive similar to that which the adverse
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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party has in the action in which the testimony
is offered."
Concerning the requirement of unavailability, the United
States Supreme Court held long ago that admitting the
prior testimony of an unavailable witness did not violate
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S, 237, 15 S. Ct. 337, 39
L. Ed. 409 (1895). In addition, the Utah Rules of Evidence recognize that a witness is unavailable when he
is exempted from testifying on the ground of privilege.
Rule 62 (7) (a), U. R. E. (1971). Because of the practical
necessities, the great weight of authority still holds that
the exercise of a privilege not to testify renders a witness
unavailable. Mason v. United States, 407 F. 2d 903 (10th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Mobley, 421 F. 2d 345 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Elmore, 423 F. 2d 775 (4th
Cir. 1970).
The requirement that the adverse party had an
opportunity for cross-examination during the previous
testimony, with an interest and motive similar to the
present action was satisfied by the prosecution's crossexamination of the codefendant.
This is clear from observing the two effects of the
codefendant's prior testimony. First, the appellant was
implicated as a perpetrator of the robbery. The effect
of this testimony presented nothing to the jury which
had not already been testified to by the two victims of
the crime, and was already an issue before the jury.
Second^ by implicating the appellant as the sole perpeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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>

trator of the robbery, the codefendant was exculpating
his own participation in the crime. This testimony was
adequately cross-examined by the prosecution in the
previous trial since the conviction of the codefendant
depended entirely upon a showing by the prosecution
that appellant was not the sole perpetrator of the crime.
Thus, the prosecution was of necessity forced into challenging the codefendant's testimony in the same way as
appellant would have done had he been the party to do
so.
For example, during the cross-examination the prosecution:
(a) challenged the codefendant's statement of appellant's reasons for returning to the bar until the codefendant admitted that the reasons did not make any
sense to him (Tr. 226) ;
(b) challenged the codefendant's statement that
appellanit was the sole perpetrator of the robbery until
the codefendant finally admitted that he did not know
that appellant took the wallets and money of the victims
(Tr. 231);
(c) challenged the codefendant's assessment of the
time in which appellant accomplished the entire robbery
until the court had to stop the prosecution for improper
questioning (Tr. 232-233);
(d) challenged the codefendant's statement that
the appellant was using a weapon until several objections
were raised by defense counsel (Tr. 233-234);
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(e) challenged the codefendant's reason for not
mentioning the truth to the police at the time he was
apprehended until defense counsel objected (Tr. 239);
(f) challenged the defendant's perception and reliability concerning his not seeing the money bag which
was used during the robbery (Tr. 235).
Therefore, the role of the appellant in the robbery,
according to the codefendant's prior testimony, could be
weighed by the jury in light of the prosecution's crossexamination, the codefendant's prior conviction, Ms reliability, and his motive in offering such testimony.
Respondent also contends that the reliability of the
prior testimony satisfied appellant's Sixth Amendment
rights. In Button v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210,
27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970), where an inmate related at trial
a statement of respondent's codefendant who did not
testify at the defendant's trial, the court held there was
no violation of Sixth Amendment rights where the testimony was sufficiently clothed with certain "indicia of
reliability." These indicia of reliability have been widely
viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be
placed before the jury though there is no confrontation
of the declarant.
In California v. Green, 399 U. S. 156, 90 S. Ct. 1930,
26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970), where a minor's statement at
respondent's preliminary hearing was admitted to prove
that respondent had furnished marijuana to the minor
in violation of Cahfornia law and where a claimed lapse
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of memory by the minor affected respondent's right to
cross-examination, the Court held that even in the absence of an opportunity for full cross-examination at
trial, the admission into evidence of the preliminary
hearing testimony did not violate the Constitution. The
Court in Green echoed the "indicia of reliability" test
and compared the purposes of the confrontation clause
with the dangers of admitting an out-of-court statement.
The majority stated that the purpose of confrontation
was to insure that the witness is under oath; that he is
subject to crossnexaminaition; and that his demeanor is
observed by the trier of fact. Id. at 158. The dangers
most courts fear in admitting out-of-court statements are
substantially lessened in the present case because the
testimony was made during a prior trial where the witness was testifying under oath and his testimony was
subject to cross-examination.
The "indicia of reliability" test, that affords the trier
of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement, was also applied in Mancussi v. Stubbs,
408 U. S. 204, 92 S. Ct. 2308, 33 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1972).
The case involved prior testimony by a state's witness
who had premanently removed himself to a foreign country and could not be compelled to return to the second
trial by the state and held that the witness was considered unavailable at the second trial and therefore
there was no constitutional error in permitting his prior
recorded testimony to be read to the jury at the trial.
In the present case, the prior statement was read into
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the record when appellant's codefendant refused to testify on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment. Under the
"indicia of reliability" standard in Mancussi, the prior
testimony of appellant's codefendant was admissible on
the grounds that the witness was unavailable at trial and
his prior testimony was reliable since it was presented
in the first trial.
In United States v. Allen, 409 F. 2d 611 (10th Cir.
1969), the court discussed the factors of unavailability,
prior tetsimony, and demeanor which have been considered in connection with confrontation issues.. The
case involved testimony or several witnesses at the preliminary hearing which was later read into the record
after defendant invoked his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment, and held that the prior testimony was admissible and did not violate appellant's right to confrontation. In the opinion the court considered three arguments which it felt were untenable. First, the court
found that the requirement of unavailability was saifcisfied not when the witness was physically present but
when his testimony was unavailable because of invocation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Second, the court
found that the preliminary hearing testimony and actual
trial testimony were substantially similar. Third, on the
basis of Mattox, supra, the court held that evidence of
the witness's demeanor while testifying at the preliminary hearing was not an essential ingredient of the confrontation privilege. Following these considerations, the
testimony of the codefendant in the present case was
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admissible because the codefendant was unavailable, the
trial testimony was taken under substantial safeguards
and the fact that the witness's demeanor was not presented fofr the jury was not controlling.
Appellant also contends that knowledge by the prosecution that appellant would invoke his privilege against
self-incrimination was a controlling factor. Respondent
has pareviously shown that the refusal of the codefendant
to testify was not anticipated by the prosecution (Tr.
187, 188). Nevertheless, "the mere calling of a witness
to the stand to make him invoke the privilege against
self ^crimination does not constitute a denial of the right
to confrontation." United States v. Gemie, 252 F. 2d 664
(2d Cir. 1958), cert, den., 356 U. S. 968, 78 S. Ot. 1006,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1073, rehearing denied, 357 U. S. 944, 78 S.
Ot. 1383, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1558. In Gemie, a witness who
was implicated in the same crime for which the defendant was being tried and who had plead guilty prior
to trial was called to the stand and invoked the privilege.
The Second Circuit was of the opinion that it made no
difference whether the government had reason to believe
that the witness would refuse to testify. The government
had a right "to produce the witness and thus show the
jury that it was bringing forward such witness as may
have knowledge bearing on the case." 252 F. 2d at 669.
Appellant bases his contention that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated primarily upon
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074,
13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1,965), which held that it was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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error to admit an out-of-court statement by a codefendant, when the codefendant refused to testify
and the statement was brought before the jury by the
prosecution's leading questions. Respondent contends
that Douglas is distinguishable from the present case
and that the more appropriate rule is the rule under
Mancussi and Green, supra. The most obvious distraction is that in Douglas the confession was made to police
officers out of court, whereas the codefendant's statement in the present case was made during a previous
trial, under oath, and subject to cross-examination. Not
only was the prior testimony in the present case subject
to cross-examination, but it was subject to cross-examination at the time the statement was made, a relevant
factor considered in Green, supra. Second, Douglas was
decided on the basis of no adequate opportunity for crossexamination whereas the quality of the cross-examination
of the codefendant is the only issue in the present case.
Third, in Douglas, the confession "formed a crucial link
in the proof both of Douglas' act and of the requisite
intent to murder." 380 U. S. at 419. In the present case
there was sufficient evidence without the admission of
the codefendant's testimony to show that a robbery had
been committed and that appellant committed the crime.
Fourth, the flagrant impropriety by the prosecution in
Douglas, is absent in the present case, for in Douglas,
after the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment, the
prosecution persisted in reading the confession bit by bit
pausing to ask the witness after each part, "Did you
make that statement?" In the present case the court
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permitted the prosecution to ask four leading questions
to which the co-defendant invoked his privilege against
self4ncrimination. None of the questions referred to the
substantive material of the transcript (Tr. 186).
C. If the court finds that the admission into evidence of the prior testimony of the codefendant presented
a constitutional issue, then the question remains whether
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427, 92 S. Ct. 1056, 31 L.
Ed. 2d 340 (1972), where three defendants tried jointly
were convicted of murder following a trial in which police
officers testified concerning a detailed confession by
petitioner's codefendant, who did not testify, and which
undermined petitioner's original version of the crime, the
Court held that any violation of petitioner's constitutional rights that might have occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the overwhelming
evidence of petitioner's guilt as manifested by his confession, which completely comported with the objective
evidence, and the compartively insignificant effect of the
codefendant's admission. The Utah Supreme Courts in
State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P. 2d 929 (1973),
where the defendant was convicted of murder following
a trial in which the testimony of two witnesses at the
preliminary hearing, Who were outside of the State at
the time of trial, was read to the jury, the Court held
that although the State had made an insufficient effort
to obtain the presence of the witnesses and the defendant was thereby denied his right to confrontation of the
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witnesses against him, the error was not such that it was
reasonably probable that there would have been a result
more favorable to the defendant in the absence of the
error. The Court reasoned that the error was to be evaluated in conformity with Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953),
which required the Court to render judgment without
regard to errors or defects which did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. In the present case if the
admission of the prior testimony was a denial of appellant's constitutional right to confrontation, then it was
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and would not
have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. At
the trial the evidence presented by the prosecution
showed that: (a) appellant and Mr. Travis entered the
lounge together and pushed Mr. Zancanella and Mr.
Roberts down on the floor (Tr. 32, 33, 80); (b) appellant
and Mr. Travis forcibly took the victims' wallets, money,
and other personal belongings, and then took money belonging to the business located in a money bag and cash
register behind the bar counter (Tr. 33-36, 55-58); (c)
Mr. Roberts was beaten and lost consciousness when he
was hit over the head (Tr. 36, 55-56); (d) two persons
left the lounge together carrying a money bag (Tr. 81);
(e) Mr. Zancanella told the police he had been robbed
(Tr. 84, 112); (f) appellant, Mr. Travis, and Miss Ruwe
were later apprehended with various rolls of coins, sacks,
and personal items belonging to Mr. Zancanella, Mr.
Roberts, and the lounge (Tr. 108, 109); (g) at the place
of apprehension, Mr. Zancanella identified appellant and
Mr. Travis as the men who had robbed him (Tr. 126).
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In addition, a witness who observed the events surrounding the crime testified that he saw two persons enter the
lounge, return with what appeared to be a money bag
and leave in a vehicle of the same description as was
later apprehended by officers and which contained the
appellant and his codefendant (Tr. 79-83). Furthermore,
the evidence showed that the appellant was apprehended
within minutes after the robbery had taken place while
he was in the process of leaving the State of Utah (Tr.
158, 159). This evidence was clearly sufficient, without
the testimony of appellant's codefendant, for the jury
to find that a robbery had been committed and appellant
was one of the persons who committed the crime. Therefore, if it appears that the introduction of the prior testimony raised a constitutional objection to the procedure
of the trial court, the error was not of sufficient weight
to preclude the jury from rendering a verdict that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition to his constitutional objection to the
procedure of the trial court, the appellant claims that
the admission into evidence of a metal club was error
since the charge of aggravated robbery had been dropped
by the prosecution. Respondent contends that the admission of the weapon was not error since Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, under which appellant was charged, required that the taking of the victims' property be "against his will, accomplished by
means of force or fear." Clearly, the possession of a
metal club by appellant was evidence to be evaluated by
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the jury in determining whether the requirements of the
statute had been met.
CONCLUSION
Because the prior testimony of appellant's codefendant was admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes, was clothed with certain indicia of reliability in
that it was made in court, under oath, and subject to
adequate crtDss^xamination, and any error that could
have been committed was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, appellant's right to confront the witnesses against
him was not denied by the procedure of the trial court.
In addition, evidence of a metal club possessed by the
appellant during the robbery was admissible to prove
one of the elements of the crome. Therefore, respondent
respectfully submits that appellant's request for reversal
or a new trial be denied and that the verdict and judgment of the jury at the trial be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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